讲座人：Jun Nakabayashi (Kindai University, Japan)
讲座题目：Detecting Large-Scale Collusion in Procurement Auctions
讲座时间：2018年3月29日(周四)，13:30-15:00
讲座地点：理科大楼 A 1712 会议室（中北校区）法商楼516室（闵行校区）
讲座主持人：周晓岚
论文提要：This paper documents evidence of widespread collusion among construction firms using a novel dataset covering most of the construction projects procured by the Japanese national government. By examining rebids that occur for auctions when all (initial) bids fail to meet the secret reserve price, we identify collusion using ideas similar to regression discontinuity. We identify about 1, 000 firms whose conduct is inconsistent with competitive behavior. These bidders were awarded about 7, 600 projects, or close to one fifth of the total number of projects in our sample. The value of these projects totals about $8.6 billion. Scaling up our estimates by the size of total public construction spending in Japan, our results imply that about 0.85% of GDP, or 4% of total national investment, is affected by collusive activity by construction firms and that collusion increases government spending by about $3.4 billion per year, or 0.4% of the total tax revenue.
演讲人简介：JunNakabayashi (中林纯)，日本近畿大学副教授，美国俄亥俄州立大学经济学博士。研究方向为实证产业组织。文章发表于JournalofPublicEconomics等国际A类期刊，并有两篇工作论文在国际最顶级期刊Econometrica(revised and resubmitted), Review of Economic Studies (reject and resubmitted request)复审中。