李笑影 | Reputation Mechanism in B2B Offline Market

时间:2019-03-11浏览:483设置

时间:2019年3月29日(周五),13:30-15:00

地点:理科大楼A302会议室(中北校区)

题目:Reputation Mechanism in B2B Offline Market

主讲人:李笑影(复旦大学)

主持人:龚冰琳

提要:

Asymmetric information is one of the main issues in trades. Moral hazard problems happen when buyers do not pay after receiving the goods. A new reputation mechanism has been adopted in Yiwu, China, to help alleviate the default risk in B2B offline market. We use a dynamic signaling model to illustrate the effect of this reputation mechanism, and surprisingly find that this mechanism does not work in all cases. If we consider seller’s heterogeneous belief of buyer’s type, reputation mechanism can either benefit or hurt seller, because reputation mechanism weakens the effect of buyer’s value on price.

主讲人简介:

李笑影,复旦大学管理学院产业经济系博士研究生。研究涉及应用微观经济学、实验经济学、信息经济学、产业组织等多个相关领域。近年来,研究成果已在《中国工业经济》、《上海经济研究》等学术期刊发表。

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