Jun Zhang:On the Informed Seller Problem: Signaling by Bayesian Persuasion and Pricing Strategies

时间:2018-04-14浏览:266设置

讲座人:Jun Zhang (University of Technology Sydney)

讲座题目:On the Informed Seller Problem: Signaling by Bayesian Persuasion and Pricing Strategies

讲座时间:2018年4月18日(周三),10:00-11:30
讲座地点:理科大楼 A 1712 会议室(中北校区)法商楼516室(闵行校区)

论文提要:This paper investigates how a privately informed seller could signal her type through Bayesian persuasion and pricing strategy. We find that it is generally impossible to signal the seller’s type through one channel alone. Furthermore, the outcome that survives the intuitive criterion always exists and is unique. This equilibrium outcome is separating, for which a closed-form solution is provided. The signaling concern forces the high type seller to disclose an inefficient amount of information and charge a higher price, resulting in fewer sales and lower profit. Finally, we show that a regulation on minimal quality could potentially hurt social welfare.讲座主持人:龚冰琳

演讲人简介:张军,澳大利亚悉尼科技大学副教授,加拿大女王大学 (Queen’s)经济学博士。张教授的研究方向为微观经济理论与产业组织,他的文章发表于Economic Journal, Journalof Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior等国际A类期刊。


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