大夏经管讲坛第13讲|Todd Kaplan教授:Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental InvestigationTodd Kaplan :Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation

时间:2018-05-03浏览:76设置

讲座时间:2018年5月11日(周五),15:00-16:30
讲座地点:理科大楼A1712会议室(中北校区)、法商南楼516会议室(闵行校区)

讲座人:Todd Kaplan (University of Exeter)

讲座题目:Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation

讲座主持人:龚冰琳

论文提要:In first and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding, second movers may discover the first movers' bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first-price auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities eliminate the usual revenue dominance of first- over second-price auctions. With a high leak probability, second-price auctions generate significantly more revenue.

演讲人简介:Todd Kaplan,英国埃克塞特大学教授,美国明尼苏达大学经济学博士。Kaplan教授的研究方向为微观经济理论、产业组织与实验经济学,他的研究成果发表于RAND Journal of Economics, International Economic Review, Games and Economic Behavior等国际A类期刊,并且与博弈理论权威Shmuel Zamir教授在博弈理论手册第四卷(Handbook of Game Theory, vol 4)中合著有“Advances in Auctions”一章。


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