讲座时间：2018年5月11日(周五)，15:00-16:30
讲座地点：理科大楼A1712会议室（中北校区）、法商南楼516会议室（闵行校区）
讲座人：Todd Kaplan (University of Exeter)
讲座题目：Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation
讲座主持人：龚冰琳
论文提要：In first and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding, second movers may discover the first movers' bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first-price auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities eliminate the usual revenue dominance of first- over second-price auctions. With a high leak probability, second-price auctions generate significantly more revenue.
演讲人简介：Todd Kaplan，英国埃克塞特大学教授，美国明尼苏达大学经济学博士。Kaplan教授的研究方向为微观经济理论、产业组织与实验经济学，他的研究成果发表于RAND Journal of Economics, International Economic Review, Games and Economic Behavior等国际A类期刊，并且与博弈理论权威Shmuel Zamir教授在博弈理论手册第四卷（Handbook of Game Theory, vol 4）中合著有“Advances in Auctions”一章。