Bo Chen :On the Role of Realtime Leaderboards in Dynamic Research Tournaments

时间:2018-06-18浏览:267设置

讲座时间:2018年6月19日(周二),15:00-16:30
讲座地点:理科大楼 A 1716 会议室(中北校区)

讲座人:Bo Chen (Southern Methodist University)

讲座题目:On the Role of Realtime Leaderboards in Dynamic Research Tournaments

讲座主持人:张敏

论文提要:This paper studies information disclosure in research tournaments. We analyze a multi-agent winner-takes-all tournament in which each agent decides when to stop a privately observed search for innovations. Each agent makes a one-time submission of her best discovery to the organizer before a deadline. The tournament ends when submissions are made from all agents, and the agent with the best innovation wins. The tournament organizer chooses between a public policy where all previous submissions are immediately revealed to the public, and a hidden policy where all submissions are revealed to the public after the organizer receives all submissions from the agents. We analyze the agents’ equilibrium behavior under the two disclosure policies. We find that the disclosure policy drastically affects the agents’ equilibrium search behavior. In particular, information can be a double-edged sword: The organizer strictly prefers to immediately reveal a submission from a stopping agent for research tournaments with long horizons, in that such research tournaments induce more intensive search behavior from the agents in equilibrium. However, the organizer can strictly prefer hiding the submission information from all the agents when the horizon is short, in that information about the submitted agents' can induce the agents to stop too early, hurting the organizer ex ante.

演讲人简介:Bo Chen,美国南卫理公会大学终身教授,美国威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校经济学博士。研究方向为动态博弈、契约理论与机制设计。



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