陈琬祎 | Population Games with Strategic Substitutes

时间:2018-09-21浏览:713设置

讲座时间:2018年9月25日(周二),2:30-14:00
讲座地点:理科大楼A 302会议室(中北校区)

讲座人:陈琬祎(中国科学技术大学)

讲座题目:Population Games with Strategic Substitutes

论文提要:

This paper studies the property of strategic substitutes in the framework of population games and features heterogeneous players. This formulation generalizes the existing models which usually rely on the assumption of aggregation games or symmetric games. This paper explores the diminishing cross effect condition on the payoff function, which delivers equilibrium uniqueness and several comparative statics results — 1. The equilibrium distribution of actions level rises in the first order stochastic dominance order when the type distribution falls in the first order stochastic dominance order and the dispersion order. 2. The equilibrium distribution of actions rises when the own action effect is larger. This model has applications in games embed with a p2p network structure and other massive social interactions with a pairwise matching nature.

讲座主持人:陈琬祎

演讲人简介:中国科学技术大学管理学院助理教授,威斯康辛大学麦迪逊分校经济学博士。研究方向为信息经济学与博弈论。


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