时 间：2020年12月1日（周二）10:30-11:30
地 点：理科大楼A1414会议室
主 题：Greening Through Finance?
主讲人：王欢欢 华东师范大学副教授
摘 要:
This paper examines the impact of strengthening enforcement of green credit regulation on firms’ loan costs, and further on their economic and environmental performance. In a simple theoretical model, with the advent of stricter enforcement of green finance regulation, the bank chooses to raise the loan rates to absorb the firm’s environmental risk. By merging a unique dataset on the bank loans with firm-level environmental penalty information, our baseline results reveal that punitive green credit regulation contributes to an 8.4% increase in the spread of loan rates between those non-compliance records and their law-abiding counterparts. We find the effects are more pronounced for non-SOEs and small firms. We further find that firms influenced have poorer economic performances both in their total liability, leverage, fixed asset, investment, and in their sales, employee, profit, and export. Even though firms’ pollution emissions have been reduced, their adoption of abatement facilities, pollution intensity, and green innovation have not been demonstrably improved. In essence, polluting firms fell to turn green because they are just shrinking rather than greening.
中文摘要：本文研究了绿色信贷管制加强后对于企业融资成本的影响，进而探究对于经济和环境总体的效果。本文建立模型说明当绿色信贷管制加强后，银行会提高贷款利率以吸收企业环境层面的风险。利用银行贷款数据以及企业受到的环境处罚数据，本文实证发现惩罚性绿色信贷管制措施带来了8.4%的贷款利率上升。这一效果在非国企和规模较小的企业中更大。尽管企业排污数量下降了，但是企业在使用绿色生产设施、排污强度和绿色研发方面并未得到显著改善。
报告人简介：
华东师范大学法学院副教授，武汉大学法学博士。主要研究领域为环境与资源保护法学，能源法以及制度与经济问题。王欢欢博士的学术成果发表于《管理世界》、《Journal of Applied Economics》等杂志。