时 间：2020年12月11日（周五）10:00-11：30
地 点：中北校区理科大楼A302 （腾讯会议在线直播 ID: 835283425）
主题：Uncertainty Aversion, Strategic Uncertainty Manoeuvre and Coalition-Formation: A Game-Theoretical Foundation for Incomplete Contracts
主讲人：马成虎，教授，复旦大学
Abstract：We present a new equilibrium solution concept for games of multi-agent interactions with which we build up a theoretical foundation for complete/incomplete contracts. The new solution sheds light on why rational agents may agree to sign incomplete contracts even though signing a complete contract incurs no cost, and it captures the complexity involved in “strategic coalition formation” or “endogenous network formation” among uncertainty averse rational agents. We discovered that, when uncertainty averse agents can form coalitions and share information regarding plan of plays among coalition members, incomplete contracts may indeed constitute equilibrium outcomes for games of multi-agent interactions. The incomplete contract as a game-theoretical solution concept is “harmonic” in a sense that no players and coalition of players have incentive to deviate from the contractual paths even though they have the freedom to do so.
演讲人简介：马成虎教授，多伦多大学经济学博士，复旦大学管理学院金融学教授。研究涉及资产定价理论、金融衍生品、投资者偏好、风险度量与管理、利率期限结构、融资融券、金融市场的福利经济学原理与汇总问题、博弈论等多个相关领域。出版专著：《金融经济学原理》，清华大学出版社；《高级资产定价理论》，中国人民大学出版社；“Advanced Asset Pricing Theory”，Imperial College Press，发表学术论文40余篇。