时 间：2022年11月3日（周四）18：00-19：30
地 点：线上，会议链接：https://work.weixin.qq.com/webapp/tm/p238648E1Kj
企业微信会议：619 569 064
题 目：Job Matching with Subsidy and Taxation
主讲人：孙宁 南京审计大学教授、社会与经济研究院院长
主持人：周晓岚 青年研究员
摘 要：
In markets for indivisible resources such as workers and objects, subsidy and taxation for an agent may depend on the set of acquired resources and prices. This paper investigates how such transfer policies interfere with the substitutes condition, which is critical for market equilibrium existence and auction mechanism performance among other important issues. For environments where the condition holds in the absence of policy intervention, we investigate which transfer policies preserve the substitutes condition in various economically meaningful settings, establishing a series of characterization theorems. For environments where the condition may fail without policy intervention, we examine how to use transfer policies to reestablish it, finding exactly when transfer policies based on scales are effective for that purpose. These results serve to inform policymakers, market designers, and market participants of how transfer policies may impact markets, so more informed decisions can be made.
报告人简介：
孙宁，南京审计大学教授、社会与经济研究院院长。长期从事市场机制设计的教学与研究工作，在Econometrica、AER、JPE等国际一流期刊发表10多篇论文，是市场机制设计研究领域的国际知名学者。2010年被聘为教育部特聘教授，入选省部级和国家级人才计划。任Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design的副主编，Frontiers of Economics of China的编委，中国运筹学会博弈论分会理事长等