时间：2019-7-13 周六14:00-15：30
地点：中北校区理科大楼A302（暂定）
主题：(De)-Anchoring Beliefs in Beauty Contest Games
主讲人：Rosemarie Nagel 教授
主持人：陈力闻 助理教授
Abstract：The beauty contest game (BCG) serves as a core framework for demonstrating behavioral non-equilibrium patterns such as focal points and level-k reasoning. We introduce a new version of the BCG that removes the bounded choice interval and thus eliminates iterative elimination of dominated strategies. We further add correlated idiosyncratic signals that can serve as (equilibrium) coordination devices. We find that choices in these new versions of the BCG are closer to equilibrium as compared with the standard BCG. Indeed, we show how variations in the design of BCGs can greatly affect the use of focal points and level-k reasoning.
主讲人简介：Rosemarie C. Nagel教授于1994年于波恩大学获得经济学博士学位，师从著名经济学界Reinhard Selten。1994-1995年，于匹兹堡大学从事博士后研究，师从著名经济学家Al Roth。1995年起于庞培法布拉大学任教职，2006年晋升为正教授。主要研究方向为行为与实验经济学，主要研究领域涵盖：宏观经济实验、神经经济学等。其论文在多本国际顶级刊物发表，其中包括American Economic Review, Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies, Economic Journal, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), Financial Times, Spektrum der Wissenschaft等。