讲座人：申培垚（上海科技大学）
讲座题目：Improving truthful reporting of polluting firms by rotating inspectors: Experimental evidence from a bribery game
讲座时间：2017年12月6日(周三)，13:30-15:00
讲座地点：理科大楼A 1712会议室（中北校区）法商楼304教师之家（闵行校区）
论文提要：We consider a two-layered review system of environmental regulations where a polluting firm periodically self-reports its emissions to a regulatory authority. The system typically requires a third party to verify the firm’s report and, in addition, an official of the regulatory authority to spot-check. If there are high potential gains from corruption, both the verifier and the official might be corruptible. Corruption is more likely in repeated-game situations, as suggested by the literature on corruption experiments. We examine the problem of under-reporting in an emissions trading scheme where both the verifier and the official are corruptible, a situation that has not previously been analysed in the literature. Our test-bed is a three-player bribery game. We study how rotation impacts the degree of under-reporting and the incidence of corruptibility in a baseline of fixed matching, a complete rotation treatment and two incomplete rotation treatments. Our findings suggest that rotating both the verifier and official improves truthful-reporting compared to situations where none is rotated. In addition, rotation of both reduces the amount of bribes.
讲座主持人：龚冰琳
演讲人简介：上海科技大学创业与管理学院助理教授，澳大利亚新南威尔士大学经济学博士。研究方向为实验经济学和环境经济学。