时间：2020年10月16日（周五）10:00-11：30
地点：理科大楼A302（中北校区）
主题：Cancellation Clauses and Hold-up with Incomplete Contract: Theory and Experimental Evidence
主讲：吴璠 助理教授
Abstract：The hold-up problem is one of the most fundamental and enduring issues in the field of Behavioral Industrial Organization. Although incomplete contracts have been studied extensively, the literature is lacking empirical, and especially experimental evidence. This paper examines the effects of fixed cancellation payment on the hold-up problem through parameterized modelling and results of a lab experiment. Our experiment results conform to the equilibrium prediction in general: setting the cancellation payment too low can lead to agents being held-up, resulting in inefficiently low investment; setting it sufficiently high can enhance the agent's incentive and solve the hold-up problem, but setting it too high could lead to the agent to invest an inefficiently high amount, i.e. the reverse hold-up problem. Our study has important policy implications that carefully designed cancellation clauses could be harnessed by policymakers and mechanism designers to achieve outcomes that maximize social welfare; Another takeaway from our experiment is the learning effect, which also implies that policymakers could expect a contract regime to become increasingly effective over time.
演讲人简介： Fan Wu (吴璠)，美国阿拉巴马大学经济学博士毕业，目前就职于上海大学经济学院产业 经济学研究中心。博士期间的研究方向主要是行为与实验经济学、环境经济学;基本完成 的研究项目主要有: 中国环境污染责任险政策的有效性研究、全球气候变化等公共产品供 应中的囚徒困境、贸易合同中的套牢与反套牢问题等;正在参与的国内课题主要有:长江 经济带国土空间规划、动静脉循环经济的协同发展模型等。